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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STJ\TE OF UTAH 
LOWELL PO·TTER, 
Plaint~ff, 
vs. 
UTAH-DRIVE-DR-SELF SYS·TEM, 
INC., a corportion of Utah, and 
V. H. ANDERSON, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
120359 
On February 2, 1959, the Plaintiff atte·nded the De-
fendant's place of business and rented an automobile. 
At the time of rental a contract covering the rental was 
executed by the Plaintiff and one oopy retaine·d by him. 
(Exhibit 3, Exhibit 8, R-5 line 21 and R-7 line 21) 
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Under the terms of the contract the Plaintiff agreed 
to return the vehicle rented the same day ·an.d a deposit 
commensurate with this period of use was received by 
the Defendant. (R-19, R-20, R-41) 
In violation of the provisions of paragraph two (2) 
on the reverse side of the Rental Agreement (Exhibit 3, 
Exhibit 8) the Plaintiff did not return the vehicle on the 
agreed date but retained the same until February 10, 
1959 (R-48, R-49). The Defendant commenced an investi-
gation on February 4, 1959 (R-44), and checked with the 
Salt Lake C'ity Police Department, the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's office, telephone directory and city directory, 
and through each source was unable to locate the Plain-
tiff or the vehicle. (R-45 through 47, R-10, R-11) 
The Defendant attended the ·County .Attorney's office 
and made a complete disclosure of facts on February 6, 
1959 (R-11, R 60, R--!7). The ·County Attorney advised 
Defendant to wait a few days to see if the vehicle would 
be returned. (R-34, R-47). The police officer was di-
rected to make a further search an-d return at a later date. 
(R-35) The Defendant and 1the police officer returned 
to the County Attorney's office on February 9, and the 
police officer represented that he had made a further 
search but he could find neither the house nor the auto-
mobile, (R-35, R-56) whereupon the County Attorney 
advised them of other f.acts "ithin his kno" ... ledge and di-
rected the Defendant to sign the Criminal Complaint. 
(R-36, R-37, R-63, R-64) There is no evidence that the 
Defendants had ~ny kno,Yledge relative to the Plaintiff 
that they did n10t communicate to the County Attorney. 
There is no evidence of any misrepresentation of fact 
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In relation to the disclosures to the County Attorney. 
The Defendant asked the County Attorney if a crime had 
been co1nmitted and the ·County Attorney advised hin1 
that a crime had been committed and recommended the 
issuance of the Complaint (R-12, R-35, R-66). The 
chronological sequence of events as shown by the testi-
monies, affidavits and reeords is as follows: 
M·ax Miner, Agent for ithe Defendent. (R-40) 
'' Q. Did you deliver the Exhibit 3 to Mr. 
Potter at the time of execution~ 
A. Yes, I did." 
The Plaintiff, lVIr. Potter testified as follows: 
• 
'' Q. D'id this eonversation that you .are 'talk""J 
about lead up to the execution of this rental agree-
nlent, this proposed Exhibit 3 ~ (R. 7) 
A Y . " . es, s1r. 
·The Defendant V. A. Anderson testified as follows: 
'' Q. Did you make any investigation in re-
lation to this rental~ (R-44) 
A. Yes, A lot of them 
* * * 
Q. And then on the 4th what investigation 
did you make~ 
A. I called the police dep.artmen t to see if 
they had any record there. I called the driver's 
lieense division aJt the State C'apitol. They had a 
license issue to Mr. Potter. I think it was 254 
Union Avenue they showed. I went to the Sheriff's 
office to see if they had any information on this 
thing an·d one place would le.ad me to anoth'er 
and- (R-45) 
Q. Did you try telephoning~ 
.... -\. Yes. 
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Q. · Were you successful1 
A. N o't in locating Mr. Potter. 
Q. Did you find a listing~ 
A. No. 
Q. Did you try the City Directory 0? 
A. I tried the City Directory and telephone 
inform~ation. 
Q. Were you able to locate the party in 
either of thos.e 1 
A. The City Directory gave Mrs. Potter as 
an employee of Harmon's Cafe. 
Q. At what address, do you recall1 
A. At about 3900 South State. 
* * * 
Q. What is your next source of inquiry after 
not being able to locate by the City Directory or 
Telephone Direct·ory 1 
A. I asked the polic.e department to put out 
an order to locate, just to locate the car, and find 
where it was so we could get in touch with them. 
Q. Were you ever informed that that car 
was located 1 
A. No. They were unsuccessful. 
Q. Did you n1ake any inquiries through the 
Sheiff's office1 (R-46) 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who did you direct your inquiries 
to at the Sheriff's office~ 
A. To Officer Mander. (Tohmander) 
Q. And what date would that approximately 
have been~ 
A. Well I think that would have been ap-
proximately the 6th of February. 
Q. And wh~at did y·ou ask the Sheriff's office 
to dof 
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MR. DUNCAN: Just a minute. I object to 
any hearsay testimony. 
THE COURT: The objection will be over-
ruled. I don't think that is hears.ay. You may 
proceed. 
A. I asked if they had a deputy in that area 
and if they would be kind enough to have him stop 
by this address and if they could locate either the 
car or Mr. Potter to ask him to come in; that he 
was late, and that we would like to know when he 
expected to bring the car back and pay the rental 
up. 
Q. Did you receive a repor't from the 
Sheriff's office~ 
A. Yes. They were unable -
* * * 
Q. What was the report that you received 
from the Sheriff's office~ 
A. They said they were unable to locate the 
address or Mr. Potter or the car. (R-47) 
Q. And who made that report to you~ 
A. Officer Tohmander. 
Q. Did you contact anybody in the Salt Lake 
City police office, the police department~ 
A. Yes, I had done that a day or so before 
and I at that time contacted Officer Stroud and 
asked him if he got out that way 'to see if he could 
locate it. 
Q. Do you know whether or not Officer 
Stroud made an investigation~ 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Did you contact the office of the County 
Attorney~ 
A. Yes. When Offi,cer S'troud came back .and 
said he couldn't find the address or the car or Mr. 
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Potter, I asked if he would mind going over to the 
County Attorney's office with me and see if they 
thought a complaint should be signed. 
Q. And who did you see in the County At-
torney's office~ 
A. Mr. Mark Miner. 
Q. And what did you tell Mr. Miner~ 
A. We told him just about exactly as I have 
told the court here now. 
Q. Is there anything that you have told the 
court at this point that you did not tell Mr. Miner~ 
A. No. No, I told ~Ir. ~liner everything I 
knew. 
Q. Was a complaint issued at that time~ 
A. No. He said he thought we had better 
w·ait a few days and see if the car didn't show up. 
Q. All right. When did you next attend the 
County Attorney's office~ (R-48) 
A. About three or four days after that. 
Q. And who was with you at that time, was 
anyone~ 
A. Officer Stroud. 
Q. Officer Stroud was 'Yith you~ 
A. Yes .... 
* * * 
Q. And who did you see in the County At-
torney's office~ 
A. Mr. Miner. 
Q. And did you n1ake any further report to 
Mr. Mine.r~ 
A. Just to the effect that the car had not 
been located nor had !fr. Potter been located, nor 
had we been .able to locate the address and ''Te 
hadn ''t been able to locate neither !fr. Potter or 
the car or the address and would he advise issuing 
the complaint~ 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. And did he so advise f 
A. Yes. He said he thought it should he 
done. 
Q. Did you thereupon sign a eomplaint ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you make any other telephone c.alls 
trying to locate th'is party~ 
A. Yes. I didn't stop attempting by phone 
and one leading to another I finally located Mrs. 
Potter's mother. 
Q. And about what ~day would that, be~ 
A. Well that was late ~the night before Mr. 
Potter brought the car in. 
THE COURT: And after the complaint "ras 
issued~ 
A. Yes." 
* * * 
"Q. Now you mentioned you noted jn the 
City Directory that Mr. Potter's wife was ern-
ployed by Harmons ~ (R-49) 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you check with Harmons Cafe? 
A. I did by phone. 
Q. And did you receive a report from them? 
A. Just to this effect that they didn't have 
any idea where she w.as at or where either she or 
he could be located. 
Q. Did ~they say whether he or she was em-
ployed by them~ 
A. She was not employed by them. 
* * * 
Q. Now did you go to 256 Union Avenue~ 
(R-50) 
A. No, I didn't. 
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Q. Did you at any rate find 256 Union 
Avenue~ 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't ever go down there~ 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't ever go down to Midvale, did 
you~ 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Well isn't it a fact that you went down 
there and tried to locate that car and tried to 
locate that 254 Union Avenue~ 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't do that~ (R-51) 
A. No. 
Q. And your testimony no'v is if Mr. Miner 
said that that is not true, isn't that right~ 
A. No. I asked Mr. Miner about 256. 
Q. You didn't say anything about that~ 
A. I got the report from the police and the 
Sheriff. 
Q. B·ut you didn't do ·anything yourself 
about that address, is that right~ 
A. Nothing except what was given to me by 
them. 
Q. You didn't go out to Midvale at any time 
to try to locate that address yourself~ 
A.· No." 
Salt Lake Sheriff Superintendent Deputy Weston 
Tohmander testified as follows: 
"Q. And what is your position in the Salt 
L.ake County ~Sheriff's office~ (R-51) 
A. Superintendent Deputy. I have charge of 
the record of cars and accidents and traffic. . .. 
Q. During that period did you receive any 
inquiry from a Mr. Vern Anderson who you have 
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just seen testify~ (R-52) 
A. I did. 
Q. Would you have any note or memoranda 
in your possession that would indicate that~ 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Would you please refer to it~ 
A. This is a report of a car, a '59 ~Chev, four 
door sedan, hard top, license number EH 5904. 
Q. Now can you, by referring to that form, 
tell me when you first had contact wi1th Mr. Ander-
sonf 
A. On the 9th is the rep·ort from the Salt 
Lake City Police Department. My contact here, 
a note on the back I have here thaJt first conta;ct 
with V em on Anderson. 
Q. All right, will you please tell me what 
your note states~ 
A. This is the car which we attempted to 
locate for Vern Anderson, Hertz Driv-Ur-Self or 
advise the driver, Lowell Pott.e.r, 256 Union Ave-
nue. This was February 5, 1959. 
Q. That was on February 5th that you had 
the inquiry apparently made at your office, is 
that right~ 
A. Yes, that's right. (R-53) 
Q. Now is this your handwriting on the back, 
sir~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is made about the time you got the 
report or the form, is that true~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did you make a report to Mr. Ander-
son~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when was that report made~ 
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A. On the 6th, this notation here, the 6th of 
February, 1959 Car 12 is the car in the Midvale 
area, reports no such address nor any of the 
neighbors have every heard of such a person. Mr. 
Anderson was advised. 
Q. Y·ou had adVised Mr. Anderson of it~ 
A. I signed it, yes, sir. 
Q. And that would be on about the 6th~ 
A. Yes, sir, February 6th. 
Q. I have no further questions." 
Salt Lake City Police Officer Alva C. Stroud testi-
fied as follows: 
"Q. And what were your duties in that de-
partment on and between those dates~ (R-54) 
A. I worked out of the auto theft bureau. 
Q. Now have you met Mr. Anderson before~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you are acquainted with him, are 
you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he n1ake inquiry of you in relation 
to a Mr. Lowell Potter on or about those dates~ 
A. Yes, sir, he did. 
Q. And what did he ask you'? 
A. He s'tated that a car had been rented and 
Lowell Potter had rented the e.ar and wanted it · 
to be check out. (R-55) 
Q. Did you make any checks in relation to 
that~ 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. What checking did you do~ 
A. I checked the address at 256 Union .A.ve-
nue ,and couldn't find any place with an address 
of that number. 
Q. On \vhich side of the street would 256 be' 
10 
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A. Are you familiar with this area, first'? 
Q. Yes, sir. On which side of the street 
would 256 be~ 
A. It would be on the south side of the 
street. 
Q. And are odd numbers on the other side~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vVere. you able 1to locate the address~ 
A. No, sir, I wasn't. 
Q. Were you looking f.or the car at the same 
time1 
A. Yes, sir, I was. 
Q. And were you able to locate the car In 
the area~ 
A. No sir, I couldn't. 
Q. Did you and Mr. Anderson attend the 
County Attorney's office~ 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. And who did you speak to in the County 
Attorney's office~ 
A. Mr. Miner. 
Q. And what did you advise Mr. Miner? 
A. I advised him I was unable to locate this 
address out on Union Avenue, this 256. 
Q. Did you advise him that you were unable 
to locate the car, also 1 
A. Yes, sir. (R-56) 
Q. And I believe, sir, you had two visits, 
so let's lim~t ourselves to the first one. Did you 
ask him whether or not he thought it advisable to 
issue a criminal complaint on this matter~ 
A. At this time he said vve should wait a fe\Y 
more days before issuing a complaint. 
Q. Did he ask y·ou to do any further investi-
gation~ 
11 
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A. Yes, sir, he did. 
Q. And what further investigation did he 
request~ 
A. I checked the driver's license bureau at 
the State Capitol to see if they had a license 
under a Lowell Potter at 256 Union Avenue. I 
also checked the State Tax ·Commission and found 
a car had been registered under I\1r·. Potter's name 
and he listed the address at 254 Union Avenue. 
Q. Did you make another tour out there~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And were you able to locate the address 
again~ 
A. No. sir. 
Q. Were you looking for the car~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you able to locate the car~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And do you know whether or not there 
has been - what do you call it - a general locate 
out on this car~ 
A. There had been, yes, sir. 
Q. And had any of your police cars reported 
on the general locate~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you again visit ~Ir. )finer and did 
you advise him of these matters that you just 
testified to? (R-57) 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were there .any other matters that may 
have come to your knowledge or information that 
you hold brim? 
A. Oh, just 'vhat we have stated here. 
Q. Now did you make notes or a report in 
relation to this matter? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
12 
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Q. And do you have that with you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did you check that before the trial? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. And so you had the written memor.anda 
that has refreshed your recolleetion of these facts, 
is that ·correct~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the last interview with Mr. Miner, did 
he recommend that a complaint issue~ 
A. Yes, sir, he did. 
* * * 
Q. Now you didn't stop and talk to anybody 
on Union Avenue~ (R-59) 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. Did you have the description of the car~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the license number~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. What time did you go out there~ (R-60) 
A. The first time was before noon. In fact 
both days it was before noon. 
Q. Do you remember what day it was~ 
A. The first day it was the 6th. The second 
time it was on the 9th. That was February." 
Deputy County Attorney M.ark S. Miner testified as 
follows: (R-61 through 66) 
"Q. Did Officer Stroud and Mr. Anderson 
attend your office for the purpose of consulting 
you in relation to having a complaint issued in 
this matter~ (R-61) 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as I recall your prior testimony, 
they attended your office on two occasions, is 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that true~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. All right. Did you have any occasion to 
consult with any other members of the County 
Attorney's staff in relation to this matter~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when would that discussion have 
taken place ~ 
A. The complete facts of this transaction 
was laid before the County Attorney and the com-
plete staff and it was their recommendation that 
a complaint be issued in this case. 
Q. And it was after that meeting that you 
told Mr. Anderson that you would recommend 
the issuance of a complaint~ 
A. There was certain events took place dur-
ing a staff meeting which brought this case under 
discussion. 
* * * 
Q. Did you have other facts at your disposal 
In relation to this case that weren't furnished 
to you by Officer Stroud and ~fr. Anderson~ 
(R-62) 
A. I did. 
Q. And did those facts affect your decision 
in this rna tter ~ 
A. They did. 
Q. Were they facts that would have normal-
ly come to the knowledge of Officer Stroud or 
first Mr. Anderson~ 
A. No. They would have no knowledge of 
these facts. 
Q. Did those facts pertain to any of the 
events related to the transaction with the Utah 
Driv-Ur-Self~ 
14 
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A. I would say no, they only related to the 
whereabouts of Mr. Potter. 
Q. Did they relate to any events that had 
taken place or transpired within the State of 
Utah~ 
A. No. 
Q. Did they relate to anything that had to 
do with the disappearance of the automobile of 
the Utah Driv-Ur-Self~ 
A. I thought so. 
Q. Did they have anything to do with the 
location of the automobile~ 
A. Well, I thought so. 
Q. But they had nothing to do with any 
facts pertaining to this particular transaction~ 
(R-63) 
A. Well, in my opinion, they did. 
* * * 
Q. Did you have any indication that the 
car might not be used locally~ 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did you tell Mr. Anderson about 
this probability at the time that he signed the 
complaint~ 
A. If I recollect I told Mr. Anderson and 
!fr. Stroud when they came into the office ~-.-hat 
I had learned at the staff meeting. 
Q. And did you have any reason to learn 
that the car might not be in the State of Utah~ 
(R-64) 
A. I did. 
* * * 
Q. I will withdraw the question. What did 
you advise Thfr. Anderson and Mr. Stroud as to 
probable location~ 
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A. I advised the1n that in 1ny opinion Mr. 
Potter had the car in 1\fontana because we had 
an inquiry from there from the District Attorney 
in Butte, Montana, concerning Mr. Potter on some 
bad checks. 
* * * 
THE COURT: Did you tell Mr. Stroud and 
Mr. Anderson thatt 
A. I told them both that. 
THE COURT: And before the complaint 
was signedt 
A. I told them before the complaint was 
signed. 
THE CO·URT: It may stand. 
Q. I'm not sure I covered this, but I think 
I did. This whole matter "~as discussed in full 
council in the County Attorney's office, is that 
truet 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And "\vere some of these inquires or 
these notes received during that conference~ 
A. Well they \vere received at my confer-
ence with Mr. Stroud and Mr. Anderson, the 
second conference was the following Monday. 
Q. No, I mean the conference with the 
County Attorney in the County Attorney's office, 
the conference 'vith the County Attorney and the 
other deputies. Did you have this conversation 
at that time1 (R-65) 
A. Yes, it caine in during the staff n1eeting 
and that is 'vhy that "~as discussed. 
Q. Now I have no further questions. 
Q. Regardless of the fact that you repre-
sented hlln you recon1mended - you represented 
bin1, I believe, this is in the past, was it not~ 
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A. Yes. 
Q. In spite of that fact you did recommend 
that the complaint be issued~ 
A. Yes. I certainly recommended that it 
be issued. 
Q. 'Vhy did you advise Mr. Anderson? 
THE COURT: Did you advise Mr. Ander-
son about that? 
A. That I had represented him~ 
THE COURT: That you recommended the 
complaint be issued. 
A. Yes, I advised it. It was on my re-com-
mendation the complaint was issued. 
Q. I have no further questions.'' 
There is on the record no indication of ~any facts 
that were known to the Defendants. and no't disclosed to 
the ·County Attorney. 
(For emphasis., the Appellant has italicized portions 
of documents and authorities. quoted in 1his brief.) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
The ·Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Dismissal, in that: 
THE AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS BEFORE THE 
COURT, NONE OF WHICH WERE ·CON'TRO·VERTED, IN-
DICATED THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD MADE A COM-
PLETE DISCLOSURE OF ALL PERTINENT F A·CTS 'TO THE 
COUN'TY ATTORNEY WHO THEREUPON OF HIS OWN 
INITIATIVE ADVISED 'THE ISSUANCE OF THE CRIMI-
NAL ·COMPLAINT. 
POINT II 
The ·Court erred in denying the defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict, in that : 
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AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLAIN'TIFF'S CASE 
IT VvAS APPAREN'T THAT ALL FACTS KNOWN TO THE 
DEFENDAN'T HAD BEEN DISCLOSED WITHOUT RESER-
\1 ATION TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND ITHAT THE 
COUNTY AT'TORNEY ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE HAD AD-
VISED THE ISSUANCE OF THE -CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 
POINT III 
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for 
a directed verdict and defendant's motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, in that : 
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CASE IT WAS AP-
pARENT TH~T THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE IN-
DICATED FULL AND ·COMPLETE DISCLOSURE OF ALL 
l\IATERIAL FACTS BY THE DEFENDANT TO THE 
COUNTY A'TTORNEY WHO OF HIS OWN VOLITION AD-
VISED THE ISSUANCE OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 
POINT IV 
The Court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion 
for Directed Verdict and Judg1nent Not Withstanding 
the Verdict, in that : 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ADDUCE ANY EVIDENCE 
OF MALICE. 
ARGlTl\fENT 
POINT I and POINT II 
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for 
summary Judgment of dismissal, in that: 
THE AFFIDAVITS AND DEPOSITIONS BEFORE THE 
COURT, NONE OF WHICH WERE ·CONTROVERTED, IN-
DICATED THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD MADE A COM-
PLETE DISCLOSURE OF ALL PERTINENT FACTS TO THE 
COUN'TY ATTORNEY WHO THEREUPON OF HIS O·WN 
INITIATIVE ADVISED 'THE ISSUANCE OF THE CRIMI-
NAL .COMPLAINT. 
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The Court erred in denying the defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict, in that: 
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLAIN'TIFF'S CASE 
IT WAS APPARENT THAT ALL FA~CTS KNOWN T'O THE 
DEFENDAN·T HAD BEEN DISCLOSED WITH,OUT RESER-
VATION TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THAT THE 
COUNTY AT'TORNEY ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE HAD AD-
VISED 'THE ISSUANCE OF THE ·CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 
The argun1ent in relation to both Point I and Point 
II will be p-resented under this heading in that the princi-
pal facts are practically identical. At the time of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the defendant's position 
was established by Affidavits and Depositions and op-
posing Affidavits were not presented. At the time of the 
Motion for Directed Verdict at the conclusion of the 
plaintiff's case, the facts had been adduced by the plain-
tiff in his case and such facts are almost identical with 
the facts shown by Affidavit, etc. 
In relation to the Summary Judgment if p·rimary 
issues or contested fac.ts are not made apparent by 
opposing Affidavits, the ·Court should enter a Summary 
Judgment. 
41, American Jurisprudence, Pleading Sec. 340. 
Page 523. 
"D. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
"340. Generally *** the courts have in gen-
eral upheld, as constitutional and valid, statutes 
or rules of Court requiring the defendant, in 
specified cases, to file an affidavit of defense, 
*** answers filed in certain classes of cases may 
be stricken out and summary judgment rendered 
on motion of the plaintiff supported by affidavit 
unless the defendant supports his answer by af-
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fidavit showing such facts as may be deemed 
by the court hearing the motion sufficient to en-
title him to defend." 
At the conclusion of the Plaintiff's case all major 
facts were of record. The Plaintiff had determined that 
Mark Miner was the Deputy Criminal Attorney for 
Salt Lake County (R-57) and that Mr. ~finer issued 
the Complaint himself. (R-35) 
"A. I issued this complaint myself. I charged 
Mr. Potter with embezzling a car," 
and that the complaint was issued by reason of addi-
tional facts within the knowledge of the ·County At-
torney. (R-36 and R-37) 
"Q. Mr. Miner, were there other facts in your 
possession that caused you to issue this com-
plaint~ 
A. Yes. 
A. Yes, in 1ny opinion a complaint should 
have been issued from the facts presented to 
me, from the information made available. 
Q. '''as the infor1nation 1nade available only 
the information furnished by !fr. Anderson and 
Officer Stroud~ 
A. No. I had other -'' 
Mr. Potter by his own testimony indicated that his 
house number did not conform to the nmnber placed 
on the car rental agreement. (R-21 and R-22) 
"Q. l\f r. Potter, "·here is your home~ 
A. ~5() Union Avenue, Midvale. 
Q. Is there a house in l\fidvale on Union 
Avenue Nu1nber 256·? 
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A. I don't know. 
Q. Is your house number 2561 
A. It is number 297 right now. 
~ .. 
Q. Do you have any relations or any in-laws 
that live at 297 East 9700 South 1 
A. That is my mother-in-law that lives 
there. 
Q. That isn't Union Avenue1 
A. That is Union Avenue." 
All of the general authorities hold that a complete 
disclosure to the County Attorney relieves the person 
signing the Complaint from any liability in a malacious 
prosecution action. The Rule of Law is well stated in 
Corpus Juri's Segundum, Volume 54, Malacious prose-
cution, Chapter V as follows: 
"SECTION 46-AS A FlJLL OR PARTIAL DE.FENS.E 
"As a general rule the defendant makes out 
a complete defense by showing that he submitted 
to the proper counsel a statement conforming to 
legal requirements concerning the guilt of the 
accused, that in good faith he received advice 
justifying the prosecutor, and that he acted on 
the advice in instituting the p-roceedings of which 
the plaintiff complains. 
As a general rule, since advice of counsel 
goes to the question of probable cause and must 
be considered in determining the matter, defend-
ant makes out a complete defense by showing that 
he submitted to proper counsel a statement con-
forming to legal requirements concerning the 
guilt of the accused, and in good faith he received 
advice justifying the prosecution, and that he 
acted on that advice in instituting the proceed-
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ings of vrhich plaintiff complains. If he shows 
these things he is entitled to immunity from dam-
ages, although it may appear that the facts did 
not warrant the advice or the prosecution or that 
the accused was innocent ***" 
"SECTION 48-BY \VlfO~I AD\TICE GTY.EN 
"Paragraph B-BY PUBLIC COUNSEL as 
follows: 
"As a general rule, the fact that the defend-
ant acted on the advice of competent and qualified 
public counsel is a defense to a suit for malacious 
prosecution ***" 
and a similar reporting of the general rule is contained 
in 34 An1erican Jurisprude1tceJ Section 72, page 748. 
"Sec. 72 Prosecuting Attorney-It is estab-
lished that if, in addition to his own belief, a 
defendant proves that before commencing the 
prosecution of the criminal proceeding com-
plained of he sought the legal advice of an officer 
selected by the people to prosecute offenders 
against la-\\~s, and in good faith fully and fairly 
disclosed to that officer all the inforn1ation he 
possessed, and he was advised that a crilne had 
been co1nmitted, the defendant has made out a 
eo1nplete defense to the action. This is true even 
though the advice Inay haYe been erroneous ... 
So, also there is authority to the effect that the 
individual ,,~ould be protected by the advice even 
though he n1ay not have stated facts which he 
eould have ascertained b;~ reasonable diligence, 
thP reason being that it is the duty of the public 
prosecutor to investigate charges of the coinmis-
sion of crime." 
ThP la\\~ in the f'tnte of 1Jtah is in conforn1ity "~ith 
thP o·t'nPral rule. The earliest TTtah case is the ease h 
l\[c l(enzi<' V8. Canning~ 131 Pacific 1172, 4:2-Utah-529, 
1913 "rherein the court stated as follo"\\t""S: 
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·'***What divides the parties is this: The 
defendant contends that the evidence with respect 
to such facts is without conflict, and hence the 
court, on his request ought to have directed a 
verdict in his favor on that ground; the plaintiff, 
that there is some conflict as to whether the 
defendant stated to counsel all the material facts 
known to him, and as to his belief of the plain-
tiff's guilt of the charge. *** We think the evi-
dence, without conflict, shows that the defendant 
substantially stated to counsel all the material 
facts known to him; that upon them they advised 
him; that he, on such advice, instituted the crimi-
nal prosecution ; and that in doing so he acted 
in good faith and upon a well-grounded belief 
of the plaintiff's guilt. *** "In other words, the 
jury 1nay not arbitrarily reject the defendant's 
evidence show~ing a well-grounded belief by him 
of the plaint~1ff's guilt. *** If the defendant *** 
had knowledge of other facts which would tend 
to explain or modify them or tending directly to 
sho"\v want of probable cause ... this would be a 
question for the jury. *** but this does not apply 
to a case where all the und~sputed facts known to 
the defendant, taken together, would justify in a 
reasonable person the honest belief that the fact 
charged was probably true. In such case the de-
fense would be absolute as matter of law, amd 
the jury would have no right under the pretense 
of saying the defendant did not beli-eve, to find 
against him. *** Upon the evidence we think the 
defendant was entitled to a directed verdict in 
his favor; for the assumed facts as to the ques-
tion of probable cause, and upon which the court 
directed the jury to return a verdict for the de-
fendant, were without any substantial conflict." 
The :\IcKenzie case was followed by Kennedy vs. 
Burbidge, 183 Pacific, 325 54 Utah-497, 1919 wherein 
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the court In a Malacious prosecution action stated as 
follows: 
(Page 326) "In an action for malicious prose-
cution at least three distinct matters are neces-
sary to be alleged and proved: ( 1) That the 
proceeding complained of as ground for the action 
was without probable cause; (2) that the pro-
ceeding was malicious; and (3) that the pro-
ceeding was finally terminated in favor of the 
plain tiff." 
(Page 328) "We are not disposed to hold that 
a prosecutor acts without probable cause merely 
because it turns out that the information upon 
which he acts was false.'' 
The case of Thomas vs. Frost, 27 Pacific 2nd, 459, 
83-Utah-207, again contains discussion of the law in 
relation to the defense of disclosure and the court stated 
as follows on page 463: 
" ( 3) The important question the court and 
jury had to consider was whether or not the 
defendant, in causing a complaint to be issued 
charging plaintiff with perjury, acted maliciously 
and 'vithout probable cause. Both must concur 
in order that the defendant be held liable. Ken-
nedy v. Burbidge~ 54 lTtah, 497, 183 P. 325, 5 
A.L.R. 1682; Singh v. !facDonald, 55 Utah, 541 
188 P. 631. 
In the Frost case there was competent testimony 
indicating that the appellant did not make truthful state-
Inents and the court a.fer reviewing such evidence stated 
as follo,vs on page 463: 
.. There was competent testimony offered by 
thr re~pondent "~hich, if believed by the jury, 
eonr.ln8ively- proved that the appellant did not 
1nake a truthful state1nent of the facts to the 
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county attorney, but, on the contrary, misled 
the county attorney." 
In the case at point there is no evidence that the 
appellant did not make a truthful statement of the facts 
to the county at orney or that he misled the county 
attorney. To the contrary, the facts indicated that in 
addition to the disclosures of the appellant, the county 
attorney on his O"\Vn initiative obtained other inforina-
tion which persuaded him to issue the ·Complaint. (R-36 
and R-37) 
In the fairly recent case of Uhr vs. Eaton, 80 Pa-
cific 2nd, 925, 95 Utah, 309 the court reaffirmed the 
fundamental law in case and stated as follows on page 
929: 
"We accordingly hold, on the record before 
us, that there appears su0h a substantial conflict 
of evidence regarding the necessary elements 
of probable cause as to require the submission of 
this issue to a jury. In .doing so, however, we do 
not relax the time-honored rule that .a truthful 
and full disclosure of the facts to a prosec~ttor 
constit~ttes a complete defense to an action of 
this kind." 
In the case at hand there is no conflict of evidence 
requiring the submision of the cause to the jury. In the 
recent case of J. Hensley Cottrell vs. Grand Union Tea 
Company, 299 Pacific 2nd, 622, 5 Utah 2nd, 187, Justice 
Crockett, in considering another case involving a mala-
cious prosecution action resulting from an e1nbezzlement 
complaint stated as follows (Page 623): 
"The critical point of inquiry is this : Con-
sidering all of the evidence, could reasonable 
minds fairly say that they were not convinced hy a 
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preponderance of the evidence that the defend-
ants made a full and truthful disclosure of the 
material facts to the country attorney~" 
In that case, the Court found that there was con-
siderable discrepancy in the testimony and some testi-
mony indicating that a full and faithful disclosure was 
not furnished. In that case, the judge notes in reference 
to evaluation of the testimony of the parties as follows: 
(Page 624) 
"Self-interest is uniformly recognized as a 
factor which may be considered in evaluating or 
in discounting testimony ... Each of the witnesses 
relied upon by the defendants have such moti-
vation ... 
"The only one of plaintiff's "Witnesses for 
'vhom they can clailn any degree of detachment 
is nfr. Taylor, t:b.e Deputy County Attorney." 
It should be noted at this point that in this case 
Mr. Miner, the Deputy County ...._-\_ttorne:~, was an in-
dependent witness, l\Ir. Stroud, the City Police Officer 
" .. as an independent ,, .. itness, and :Jir. Tohmander of the 
County Sheriff's Office, "\Yas an independent 'ritness 
and none of these "\ritnesses " .. ere n1otivated b:~ any pe-
cuniary interest. Justice Henroid, in his dissent to the 
Cottrell case, (Page 627) stated as foli0'\\7S: 
''The only pertinent question here is whether, 
before signing a con1plaint against the plaintiff 
for e1nbezzlernent, respondents made a full dis-
closure of the n1aterial facts in their possession, 
to a DPput~ .. County Attorne:T, who, after filing 
the ron1plain t, rnoved its dismissal 'rhich was 
granted." 
~r r. rraylo.r, Deputy County Attorney in the Cottrell 
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case, stated that his opinon might have been changed if 
additional facts propounded by the Plaintiff had been 
disclosed. In the instant case the Deputy ·County At-
torney, ~Ir. ~finor, made no such qualifications nor were 
any additional facts propounded by the Plaintiff. 
Our sister states have had two rather recent eases 
involving a similar issue. In the case of Montgomery 
Ward & Company vs. Pherson, 272 Pacific 2nd, 643, 
Colorado 1954; another case involving malicious prose-
cution as a result of a complaint in embezzlement, the 
Court stated as follows (Page 646): 
(Page 646) " ( 5) It is for the best interests of 
society that those who offend against the laws 
of the state shall be promptly punished, and that 
any citizen who has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the law has been violated shall have the right 
to cause the arrest of the person whom he hon-
estly and in good faith believes to be the offender. 
For the p1.trpose of protecti·ng h£'m in so doing, 
it is the generally established r1.tle that if he has 
reasonable grottnds for his belief, and acts there-
on in good faith in causing the arrest, he shall 
not be subjected to damages merely because the 
accused £s not convicted. The rule is fo111nded on 
the grounds of public policy in order to encour-
age the exposure of crime. 
(Page 647) "The rule that advice of counsel, 
properly taken and relied upon in good faith, 
is a defense to a suit for malicious prosecution 
applies with greater reason when the proceeding 
complained of was instituted by and with the 
approval of the prosecuting officer, in this in-
stance the district attorney." 
" ... 'Acting in good faith upon the mistaken 
opinion of counsel will not subject the prosecutor 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to liability to the person prosecuted.' " (Page 648) 
". . . The evidence, it seems to us, clearly 
established the defendants instituted the prose-
cution in good faith and on advice of counsel, 
and that under the evidence presented defend-
ant's motion for a directed verdict in their favor 
should have been granted. 
"These conclusions make it unnecessary for 
us to consider the other points urged for reversal 
of the Judgment. 
(Page 648) "The Judgment is reversed and 
the cause is remanded with direction to enter 
judgment in favor of the defendants." 
Thomas vs. Hinton, 281 Pacific 2nd, 1050, 78 Idaho 
337, April 1955 : 
(Page 1055) "'*** "In this class of cases the 
liability of juries to lose sight of the real issues, 
and to be influenced by sentiment, rather than 
the pertinent facts, is noted by careful observers. 
In the language of ~!r. Newell: "Our experience 
teaches us there are feu~ questionsof law more 
diffvcult of apprehension by a jury than those 
wh~ch govern trials for malicious prose·cution. It 
seems difficult for them to appreciate, if the 
plaintiff was really innocent of the charge for 
"rhich he "\Vas prosecuted, that he still ought not 
to recover. They do not readily comprehend why 
an innocent man n1ay be prosecuted for a sup-
posed crime or offense, and yet have no recourse 
against the prosecutor "\vho caused his arrest and 
i111prison1nent.' Ne,vell on Mal. Pros. 279." '" 
1\f ontgorner~ .. Ward & Co. vs. Pherson, Colo., 272 
Pacific 2nd 643 at pages 646, 648." 
(Page 1056) "Where the evidence clearly es-
tablishes that the defendant instituted the prose-
ention in good faith and on the advice of counsel, 
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a motion for directed verdict in defendant's favor 
should be granted. Montgomery Ward & Co. vs. 
l)herson, Colo., 272 Pacific 2nd, 643. 
"It is our opini~on that appellant complied 
with the advice of counsel rttle. It} therefore} 
becan~e a q1testion of law for the court to ,dec~de 
and not a question of fact to be submitted to 
the jury and the motion for a d~recte.d verdict 
should have been granted.'} 
The above cases contain profound staten1ents re-
lating to the public policy involved in malacious prose-
ution cases and when such policy is applied to the instant 
case there should he no question but that the defendants 
should he immune from damages. 
POINT III 
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for 
a directed verdict and defendant's motion for Judgment 
Not Withstanding the Verdict, in that: 
AT THE .CON~CLUSION OF THE CASE IT WAS AP-
PARENT THkT THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE IN-
DICATED FULL AND ·COMPLETE DISCLOSURE OF ALL 
MATERIAL FACTS BY THE DEFENDANT TO THE 
COUNTY ~TTORNEY WHO OF HIS O·WN VOLITION AD-
VISED THE ISSUANCE OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 
The authorities cited in support of points I and II 
are equally applicable in support of this point. 
The factual situation differs in the consideration 
of this point for the reason that the defendants had pre-
sented their case and there is affirmative evidence in 
the record as to the disclosures and the basis for the 
disclosures to the County Attorney. The defendants 
established affirmatively that copy of the written con-
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tract of rental was delivered to the plaintiff (R-40) 
and that the cash deposit taken under the rental agree-
ment was in accordance with the general policy of the 
defendant corporation for a one-day rental and that 
if the car was to have been detained for a longer period, 
a larger deposit would have been required (R-41). The 
investigation by Mr. Anderson, rental manager for the 
defendant, was reviewed in detail and it was sho·wn 
that the defendant checked the telephone directory, tele-
phone information service, city directory and driver's 
license division personally (R-44, -±5.) It is further shown 
that the defendant solicited the aid of the Police De-
partment and the Sheriff's Office and asked that they 
attempt to locate either the residence or the car. (R-
45-49) 
It was indicated that there might be a possibility 
of a relationship between ~Ir. Anderson and the plain-
tiff's 'rife, but that if there 'Yas such a relationship, it 
"'"as unkno'vn to l\Ir. Anderson and there is no indication 
that there was any ill "~II between the parties. (R-50 
and R-71) The County Sheriff testified as to his search 
and his report to l\Ir. Anderson. ( R-51, R-5±) The Police 
Offirer testified as to his search and report to ~1r. 
Anderson and the fact that he alone represented to 
the County Attorney that a diligent search had been 
1nade to detern1ine the residenee of the plaintiff (R-54 
through R-66) sperifirally as follows: 
Q. u Did you n1ake another tour out there'? 
(R-56) 
A "'\:T • • _t es, s1r. 
Q. And "·ere YOU able to locate the address 
'l O''l]•Jl ~ ( ~~ ( ' . 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. Were you looking for the car~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you able to locate the car~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And do you know whether or not there 
has been- what do you call it- a general locate 
out on this car~ 
A. There had been, yes, sir. 
Q. And had any of your police cars reported 
on the general locate~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you again visit Mr. Miner and did 
you advise him of these matters that you just 
testifed to~ (R-57) 
A Y . " . es, s1r. 
The Deputy County Attorney was recalled as a 
witness and testified that the entire n1atter had been 
placed before the County Attorney's Staff and that it 
was their recommendation that a ·Complaint be issued 
(R-61). Further, the Deputy County Attorney indicated 
that he had obtained additional facts or information 
from independent sources and such facts influenced his 
decision. 
"Q. And it was after that meeting that you 
told Mr. Anderson that you would recommend 
the issuance of a Complaint~ (R-61) 
A. There was certain events took place dur-
ing a staff meeting which brought this case under 
discussion. 
Q. Well were there other facts besides those~ 
A. Yes. Other facts that were brought into 
this case and that, coupled with -
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THE COURT: Mr. Miner, I believe you 
had. better proceed by question and answer so 
that we know what is coming and what to expect. 
(R-62) 
MR. BIELE: Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have other facts at your disposal 
in relation to this case that weren't furnished to 
you by Officer Stroud and Mr. Anderson~ 
A. I did. 
Q. And did those facts affect your decision 
in this matter~ 
A. They did. 
Q. Did you have any indication that the car 
n1ight not be used locally J? (R-63) 
A. Yes, I did." 
The case no'v differs from the case at the close of 
the plaintiff's testimony in that it now appears that the 
County ..~..L\.. ttorney directed the issuance of the Complaint 
based on infor1nation obtained by him through his office 
and, therefore, a different rule of la"T applies. This rule 
is succulently stated in the annotation at 10 A.L.R. 2d, 
1215: 
(Page 1217) ... "The question is, What had 
the defendant the right to assu1ne at the time he 
called upon the prosecutor the second time and 
was directed by him to 1nake oath to this com-
plaint~ ... It must be assumed that defendant, 
in swearing to the affidavit, if he himself believed 
the truth of the staten1ents, was acting under the 
direction of the prosecutor. and had the right to 
assume that the prosecutor "Tas instituting the 
suit on behalf of the public ... '~ 
''The rule in connection with cases in which 
the defendant leaves the matter entirely to the 
judg1nen t and responsibility of the prosecuting 
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officer after a full, fair, and honest discosure 
of the 'facts, was aptly stated in Hopkinson vs. 
Lehigh Valley R. Co. (1928) 249 N.Y. 29,6, 164 
NE 104 as follows: 'If a person disclosed faiJrly 
and trt~hfully to an officer whose duty ~t is to 
prosecute crime, all matters within his knowledge, 
which as a man of ordinary intelligence he ~s 
bound to suppose would have a mater~al bearing 
tttpon the question of the innocence or guilt of 
the persons suspected, and leaves it to the prose-
cutor to act entirely upon his own judgm,ent and 
responsibility as a public officer, and does no 
more, he cannot be held answerable in an action 
for malicious prosecution, even if the officer 
comes to ,a wrong conclusion and prosecutes when 
he otttght not to do so.'" 
It is difficult to conceive how a private citizen could 
conduct a more detailed investigation than was devel-
oped by the defendant in this case. If the ,c·ourt sustains 
the verdict, it in effect tells the private citizens of this 
state that they may not rely upon the repTesentations 
of the Police Officers or Deputy ·County Sheriffs or the 
County Attorney, but must, in each and every case, 
personally investigate the facts and further must hire 
private counsel rather than rely upon public prosecutor 
to advise them as to their potential liabilities when they 
are attempting to do their civic duty in reporting the 
• 
com1nission of a suspected crime. 
POINT IV 
The Court erred in deyning the Defendant's Motion 
For Directed Verdict and Judgment Not Withstanding 
the Verdict, in that : 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ADDUCE ANY EVIDEN'CE 
OF MALICE. 
33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In order for the Plaintiff to recover, he Inust prove 
1nalice or at the minimum, show facts or fact situations 
from which the jury may infer r11alice. This rule is set 
forth in 34 American Jurisprudence, Malicious Prosecu-
tion, section 44 as follows : 
"C. MALICE 
Page 727 "44 Generally'' It is an elementary 
rule, supp·orted by numerous authorities, that it 
is essential to a recovery in the action of mala-
ci·ous prosecution that the action or prosecution 
complained of must have been maliJci·ously insti-
tuted. This is true whether the action is for the 
prosecution of the criminal proceeding or civil 
action *** If there was no 1nalice, no verdict at 
all shottd be given. Malice is essential to the main-
tenance of any such action, and not merely to 
the recovery of exemplary damages, it, as well 
as the 'vant of probable cause, is of the essence 
of the action *** 
Page 729 '~Sec. 45 *** "It is also distin-
guishable from mere negligence, in that it arises 
from some purpose "\rhile negligence arises from 
absence of purpose, the characteristic of negli-
gence is inadvertence or an absence of intent to 
InJure, but to constitute 1naliJce there must be a 
1notive or puTpose, and it 1nust be an improper 
one." 
• 
In this case there is not a scintilla of evidence indi-
cating n1alice. In fact the record js con1pletely devoid 
of any evidence indicating that the Defendants or either 
of the1n knew the Plaintiff or had any reason or desire 
to do him harn1. 
1\faliee is the very essence of an action of malicious 
prosecution and "Then, as In this case, the Defendant 
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shows that it had no knowledge or intimate connection 
\vhatsoever with the Plaintiff and that it relied on the 
advice of the prosecuting attorney then any presumption 
of malice that might arise by reason of the execution 
of the criminal complaint is completely rebutted. 
The matter of malice is reported in 10 A.L.R. 2nd 
1215 at page 1268 et seq. and one of the best statements 
therein contained is on page 1269 as follows : 
"It is a well-settled rule in cases of this char-
acter, when malice or its equivalent may be in-
volved, that, if the defendant acted solely upon 
the advice of a reputable attorney, after fairly 
submitting to him all of the facts, this will make 
out a complete case against malice or bad faith." 
"***The case appears to be wholly without merit. 
From the beginning to the end of the proceed-
ing appellant acted with the utmost good faith, 
and under the advice of those in authority to 
whom he applied, and the evidence shows satis-
factorily that there was an entire absence of any 
malice on his part toward appellee. Want of 
probable cause and malice must concur to sustain 
the action for malicious prosecution. Malice hav-
ing been disp-roved, the action must fail.'' 
CONCLUSIO,N 
The Plaintiff must show malice as an essential part 
of his cause of action. A slight presumption of malice 
arises by reason of the execution by the defendant of 
the criminal complaint. The defendants have clearly 
shown that all material facts known to them were dis-
closed to the county attorney who added thereto facts 
or circumstances within his own knowledge and advised 
the issuance of the criminal complaint. The presumption 
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is" clearly' rebutted by the disclosures and therefore the 
court must look to the record of the trial in order to 
determine the existance of actual malice. No malice is 
disclosed by any part or portion of the record nor is 
there any indication of concealment or failure to dis-
close material facts. 
Since the record reveals that there is complete dis-
closure of all material facts to the County Attorney the 
court should set aside the judgment and grant plaintiff's 
Motion for Judgment Non Abstante Veredicto. 
Even if the court should determine that some addi-
tional facts could have been disclosed by the exercise 
of extraordinary diligence, nevertheless since the· county 
attorney advised the execution of the complaint, not 
only by reason of the facts disclosed by the defendants 
but by reason of additional facts known only to him, 
it becomes apparent that the county attorney as an 
officer of the state is the moving party in the execution 
of the criminal co1nplaint and the judgment should be 
set aside and the defendants ~lotion for Judgment Non 
Abstante \T eredicto should be granted. 
Further, since the defendants have made full dis-
closures of all material facts known to them and on 
the advice of the county attorney executed the criminal 
coinplaint, any presumption of malice is overcome and 
the court n1ust look to the record in order to determine 
actual malire. No actual n1alice or ill motive is indicated 
hy- th0 rerord or may be presmned by facts sho'vn in 
the record, and therefore, the Plaintiff's cause fails for 
Iar.k of a 1naterial element of this cause of action and 
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the Judgment should be set aside and Plaintiff's Motion 
for Judgment Non Abstante Veredicto granted. 
Respectfully submittted, 
IRVING H. BIELE 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Appellants 
Receipt of copies of the above and foregoing Brief 
of the Defendants and Appellants acknowledged this 
---------------- day of June, 1960. 
------------------ .. ----.------------------ .. -----------------
LaMAR DUNCAN 
Attorneys for PlaJinttff 
and Respondent 
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